This research report aims to illustrate the methodology of the research question
I. Introduction
According to Barton C. Hacker scientific methods and technological applications were pretty much apart in the history of human beings thereby science was more akin to philosophy and technology to craft 2 . Prior to the 19 th century, defence instal lations, weaponry and strategic thinking in military matters had all been provided through practicable and traditional methods communicated by means of master apprentice relationships 3 . However, in the first half of the 20 th century, the mechani zation of armed forces reached a peak in the way that a huge alteration in the per ception of technology and science took place. Military technological innovations in Europe became the major driving force for modernization 4 in the Ottoman Em pire as in other non Western societies. This process imposed a lot of pressure on Ottoman society and economy driven by the introduction of empirical sciences. It was forced upon through the supporters of the state, mostly the military elite that considered the traditional means no longer as adequate 5 . In this framework, my study seeks to discover the role of Western attractiveness in weapons technology in stimulating the military modernization of Ottoman Turkey.
The process of modernization is deeply related to the notion of the ›nationstate‹ which had been come upon as a brand new concept in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. Furthermore, major socioeconomic transformations were concomitant to and in stigated by the effects of industrialization. Modernization, with its multifaceted character involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity MGZ 70 (2011) Nachrichten aus der Forschung virtually every institution of society -in the way that the transformations in one institution tended to produce complementary transformations in others 7 . From this perspective, the history of Ottoman military transformation reflects constant pres sure imposed by the industrializing West 8 . The economic peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire and its ›incorporation‹ in the capitalist world economy has been object of much scholarly debate, particu larly among the proponents of modern world system and centreperiphery theory. Immanuel Wallerstein, the pioneer of the modern world system theory, discussed the notion of ›incorporation‹ and in this sense emphasized that the production pro cesses in various Ottoman regions were integrated into the system of division of labour that the capitalist world economy in the modern age brought about. The chronological aspects of this process have been widely debated among scholars and up to now this issue has not been resolved 9 . With the integration into the modern world system, the Ottoman Empire as ›periphery‹ began to rearrange its economic activities in the frame of the ›centre's‹ mode of production and circula tion. Thus, as a peripheralized actor, specialized in the production and exportation of specific raw materials, Ottomans used to import technologically intensive goods from the ›centre‹.
Through the second half of the 19 th century and on the eve of World War I, mod ern Prussian/German military institutions held their ›central‹ position in military technological advancement. The ›German way of war‹ 10 met the physical demands of the modern battlefield and the German professional synergy of training, leader ship and mass production in armaments made it quite distinguished 11 . Successful mechanization of the army and industrial research that were so well established in Germany paved the way for a powerful infrastructure in weapons industry, and not only in the field of weapons systems but also of transportation technology like railroads and communication systems (telegraph, radio etc.) . Clearly, among the customers of these industries were from the early beginning nonWestern socie ties. The Ottoman Empire in its postclassical age placed a high amount of orders with German defense companies. Furthermore, the years between 1870 and 1918, being the period under scrutiny in this study, displayed an active involvement of the German Reich in the ›Eastern Question‹. Germany's pénétration pacifique to the Ottoman lands made possible the appearance of Prussian military reformers and agents of Germany's armament industries in Ottoman Turkey According to the prior research on Ottoman technological capacity, it is not ac curate to say that the Ottomans did not realize the importance of industrialization in military technology. During the Tanzimat 13 period, many endeavors were made to improve the industrial infrastructure and many premodern installations were updated. The industrial estate in Zeytinburnu and the Iron Casting Factory (Zeytinburnu Demir Döküm Fabrikası) founded in the environs of the same place aimed to meet the needs of the army. Other installations such as the Imperial Armory (Tüfekhane-i Amire), the Gunpowder Factory (Baruthane-i Amire), Imperial Arsenal in Maçka (Maçka Silahhane-i Amire) and the Imperial Cannon Factory (Tophane) were drastically modernized. This modernization was mainly based on the transfer of production methods and procedures from the West. So, the technology transfer ventured by the Ottomans should not be regarded as a process pursued to acquire brandnew weapons; it was rather a complementary process that went hand in hand with the transfer of knowhow and scientific methods. Furthermore, it was on the agenda of Ottoman Empire to invest in scientific development via modern ized academic institutions.
One of the expected outcomes of this study is that Ottomans, being ›incorpo rated‹ into the capitalist economy and their dependency on European products of mass production and in particular on technologically intensive goods having be come stronger, plunged into an increasing ineffectiveness of warfare. In other words, the Ottoman Empire -as in its classical age -was a society open to changes and innovations in military technology. However, there are breaking points in its history that made the empire lag behind Western innovations, these moments of major crises being mostly due to economic factors. So, theories on the Ottomans' incapability regarding their perceptions of technological innovation and their back wardness in defense industry as a result of a traditional mode of production, should be revised after a thorough study on the scope of technological transfer and the ways it shaped the Empire's production capacity.
II. State of the Art
Studies on scientific and technological change in Ottoman military can be found in a number of works such as by V.J. Parry, M.E. Yapp., Halil Inalcik, Gabor Agoston, Salim Aydüz on the 16 th to 18 th centuries and mainly by M.E. Yapp and G.W. Swan son on the 19 th century 14 . Contributions to War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, a major collective volume on this issue, examine the relationship between de velopments in war and technology and the changes in forms of social organization since the times of Muhammed. The articles of Yapp and Inalcik give information on the introduction of firearms in the Ottoman Empire and the sociopolitical ef fects of the diffusion of firearms in the Middle East. Their analysis, specifically on the early importation of military technology, is a great help for our study since we are able to figure out the initial contacts of the Ottoman Empire with its European counterparts in the field of military affairs. However, some issues such as Inalcik's study on the impact of the spread of guns on the Celali revolts in the 16 th and 17 th centuries are beyond the scope of this study. The last section of this collective volume was spared to an article by G.W. Swan son 15 which has particular relevance for our study. Swanson emphasizes the im portance of Mahmud Şevket Pasha, former student of Freiherr von der Goltz Pasha (who had been appointed as Inspector Commission to the Military Schools in Ottoman Turkey), in the development of military thought and applications in the Ottoman army. Mahmud Şevket was one of the initial instructors of modern war techniques and army maneuvers. Yapp and Swanson briefly expound on the short ages that occurred in the process of organizing the Ottoman army according to European examples. One striking outcome of the introduction of modern war tech niques was Sultan Abdulhamid's II (reigned 1876-1909) fear of the social and politi cal effects this might have on his young officers. Indeed, in Abdulhamid's scepti cal mind there was always great fear to be killed in a rebellion against him with one of the Mauser rifles which he himself had ordered to buy. Roger Owen, in a review of Parry's and Yapp's study, does not accept this conclusion and asserts that political and military reliability went hand in hand and if the reverse might have occurred, there would not have been huge orders to German arms companies 16 . These remarks by Roger Owen should be taken into account: The arms trade from Germany required a comprehensive policy among the military and political elite of the Ottoman Empire, but official documentation analyzed during our research reveals a situation which is more supportive of Swanson's position. Specifically, von der Goltz's writings show us that the Ottoman officer corps was not able to do artillery practice because most of the purchased weapons were left to perish on stock 17 . The detailed works of Salim Aydüz 18 and Gábor Ágoston 19 on military techno logy in the classical age give lavish and thoughtprovoking information based on firsthand archival sources. Ágoston's important work on military and technologi cal history gives crucial details on arms manufacturing and gunpowder technol ogy. Ágoston mainly used Ottoman archival documents and although he focuses on 16 th through 18 th centuries, he contributes valuable information on the last phase of Ottoman Empire. Specifically, the extensive data on the raw materials used to make gunpowder and guns, the locations and the capacities of the production cen ters will be helpful for our study. Aydüz discusses the capacity of Ottoman mili tary technology from its beginnings, but leaves the last phase untouched. Our study, emphasizing the period between 1870-1918, will thus complement Aydüz' and Ágoston's work.
Besides the technological capacity of the Ottomans, the relationship between Germany and Ottoman Empire specifically on arms transfer has been an interesting topic for economic and diplomatic historians. The crucial study that has to be men tioned here is Jehuda Wallach's work on missions of Prussian and German mili tary officers in Ottoman Turkey 20 . Wallach's study is a distinguished and original work since the author refers amply to German archives. He benefitted in particu lar from documents on arms trade from Krupp Company. Wallach points out the importance of German diplomacy towards the Ottoman Empire and defines the members of the German military mission as actors in this play of international pol itics. Wallach gives much importance to the hidden actors of these military mis sions who were apparently agents of German arms companies in Istanbul. Virgi nia Aksan, in a recent review article on Ottoman military studies 21 , has stated that Ottoman military historiography is a surprisingly neglected field and in particu lar the period after 1600 is a widely unknown field. Aksan stresses the necessity for extensive archival research in order to come to a better understanding of the Ottoman military system.
III. Research Objectives
The major objective of our study is to determine precisely the transformation of Ottoman military science and weapons technology in the framework of Ottoman armament policy between 1870 and 1918. In the beginning of this study the effects of the ›military revolution‹ Europe had experienced from the early 16 th through the 17 th centuries (the exact chronology being much under debate) on Ottoman military campaigns will be analyzed. It is also intended to have a close look at the newly settled arms transfer system with the emergence of European arms companies in the postrevolution period. One further crucial objective of this study is to elaborate on the development of Otto man domestic industry that is regarded as dramatically underdeveloped due to relying excessively on technology transfer.
On the other hand, Ottoman responses to the European economic challenge in military industry are relatively unknown and the modernization efforts in military industrial zones mainly in Imperial Cannon Factory are unexplored. As a matter of this fact, the study aims to investigate the responses of Ottoman Empire to the new European industrial techniques and inquire whether the recovery of the production capacity brought the Ottomans level to its counterparts in neighboring regions, specifically to Russia which was following a good progress in structuring its national innovation strategy in arms industry.
IV. Hypotheses and Research Questions
Guiding research questions will concern, besides the question of the theoretical framework, the issues of technology transfer and economic structure.
Theoretical Framework: How should technological advancements in Ottoman mil itary matters, armament policy and the dependence on European arms producers -in economic and technological terms -considered within the framework of mod ernization, centreperiphery, dependency, and world system theories? This study will use as its guideline historical methods. Within this framework, pri mary sources -in particular archival documents -will be analyzed to resolve the research problems indicated above. The tools of document analysis method and content analysis method will be used as data gathering technique. The sources to be used have been already identified by archival and library research. The relevant primary sources were singled out after a complete indepth analysis of the follow ing institutions: Dennis Edwin Showalter, »More than Nuts and Bolts: Technology and the German Army, 1870 -1945 ,« The Historian, 22.9.2002 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914 -1918 (Princeton, NJ, 1968 , 4 f.
13
Tanzimat is the age of reform and modernization in Ottoman Empire, which was initially promulgated in 1839 by a »Ferman« (Royal Decree) of the Sultan. It is also known as the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane, proclaimed in public in the Palace of Roses as a Noble Writ. 
